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Abstract 
This paper interrogates the meaning of lifting all women as we climb the ladder of 
gender equality and justice by recognizing that gender violence affects women 
differently. This is because violence against women is perpetrated not only on the 
basis of their gender or sex but also other identities of race, religion, caste, region, 
age, disability, nationality, sexual orientation etc. With reference to CEDAW 
jurisprudence and examples from India, I seek to explain this understanding with 
the help of a normative framework of ‘intersectional integrity’. The framework 
insists on considering claimants as a whole by tracing unique and shared patterns 
of gender violence when it is also based on other identities such as race, religion, 
caste, region, age, disability, nationality, and sexual orientation. I argue that 
applying the framework allows us to diagnose and address the nature of violence 
suffered on multiple identities, in a clear and comprehensive way. 
Key words 
Gender violence; intersectionality; CEDAW; India 
Resumen 
Este artículo cuestiona el sentido de levantar a todas las mujeres a medida que se 
asciende la escalera de la igualdad de género y la justicia, reconociendo que la 
violencia de género afecta a las mujeres de manera diferente. Esto se debe a que la 
violencia contra las mujeres se comete no sólo sobre la base de su género o sexo, 
sino también por su raza, religión, casta, región, edad, discapacidad, nacionalidad, 
orientación sexual, etc. Se pretende explicar esta afirmación con la ayuda de un 
marco normativo de “integridad interseccional”, a través de referencias a la 
jurisprudencia del CEDAW y ejemplos de la India. El marco insiste en considerar a 
las demandantes en su conjunto, trazando patrones únicos y compartidos de 
violencia de género cuando se basa también en otras identidades como raza, 
religión, casta, región, edad, discapacidad, nacionalidad, orientación sexual. Se 
sostiene que la aplicación del marco permite diagnosticar y abordar la naturaleza de 
la violencia sufrida en múltiples identidades, de forma clara y completa. 
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1. Introduction 
Lifting As We Climb was chosen as the guiding epithet upon the formation of the 
National Association of Colored Women’s Club in the United States (Encyclopedia 
Britannica 2015). It was inspired by the commitment of Black women’s movement 
to relate to and uplift all women and all dispossessed. To them, inclusiveness and 
diversity was of central significance in feminist politics.  
In comparison, the women’s movement surrounding gender violence in India seems 
to be fractured by its apparent display of universality. Within the discourse on 
gender justice following the brutal gape rape and death of the 23-year-old 
physiotherapy student Jyoti Singh Pandey in December 2012 in New Delhi, there is 
a small but strong sub-current for recognizing intersectionality in women’s identities 
for redressing violations. The claim is that gender violence is not just a matter of 
gender subordination but is also shaped by experiences grounded in the 
intersections of gender with other identities such as caste, creed, religion, class, 
age, disability, nationality and sexual orientation. In this sense, the experiences of 
rape or sexual assault may be vastly dissimilar but equally shocking. But the 
possibility of having these other identities recognized in the legal understanding of 
gender violence remains a continuing struggle in India, as it does elsewhere.  
This paper interrogates the meaning of lifting all women as we climb the ladder of 
gender equality and justice. It expands and explains the category of intersectional 
gender violence through the lens of intersectionality theory and the right to 
integrity so that it includes experiences of persons with intersectional identities, i.e. 
intersections of sex, gender, race, caste, class, religion, region, nationality, sexual 
orientation, disability, age etc. I argue that this framework of ‘intersectional 
integrity’ provides the normative backbone for conceptualizing gender violence in a 
more inclusive and effective manner.  
This paper is divided into three parts. Part I introduces the normative framework of 
‘intersectional integrity’ for understanding gender violence suffered not just 
because of gender but also other status-identities. This normative framework is 
developed in appreciation of intersectionality theory developed by Kimberlé W 
Crenshaw and the right to integrity as developed in disability jurisprudence. The 
framework provides the theoretical background for understanding the nature of 
intersectional gender violence in law. Part II analyses the treatment of 
intersectional gender violence in international law and demonstrates the easy 
possibility of classifying individual complaints on gender violence decided by the 
CEDAW Committee in intersectional terms. In light of the theoretical background 
and CEDAW jurisprudence, Part III seeks to explain the nature of intersectional 
gender violence in India. It begins with three cases that, despite their intersectional 
dimensions, were simply classified as ‘gender’ violence cases. As a State Party to 
CEDAW, the developments within the Indian discourse are also reflected in the NGO 
Shadow Reports submitted to the CEDAW Committee. The existing legal position is 
consolidated in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, which was prompted by 
the Justice Verma Committee Report that stands as one of the most progressive 
statements on gender violence in India. The paper tests the legal developments 
against the conceptual framework of intersectional integrity in redressing 
intersectional gender violence. The emerging insight is that the domestic and 
international legal developments have not fully and consistently captured the 
nature of intersectional gender violence. It is with the application of the framework 
of intersectional integrity that we uncover the nature of gender violence based on 
victims’ multiple identities, which in turn assists in redressing these violations. 
Thus, the framework brings diagnostic clarity in detecting, understanding and 
describing the nature of harm involved in intersectional gender violence, which 
feeds into the ultimate finding a judicial body makes in adjudicating such a claim or 
the formulation a legislature adopts in preventing and prohibiting it. In this sense, 
the paper’s diagnostic aim unearths the conceptual roots for understanding the 
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nature of intersectional gender violence, which can in turn assist in realizing 
legislative, policy and adjudicative aims for addressing it.  
This paper focuses primarily on intersectional gender violence against women, i.e. 
violence against women perpetrated not only because of their sex or gender, but 
also because of their caste, race, religion, region, nationality, occupation, class, 
sexual orientation, age, disability etc. The use of the ‘embarrassed “etc”’ (Butler 
1990, p. 182) at the end of the list of relevant status-identities is meant to denote 
the possibility of recognizing identities beyond those that are listed in legal 
documents, like the constitutional and legislative guarantees of non-discrimination. 
Within the limits of how identities come to be recognized in law, say, as ‘grounds’ 
or ‘analogous grounds’ of discrimination, this paper leaves open the possibility of 
intersectional gender violence to cash in on the opportunity to make gender 
violence more inclusive and representative (Fredman 2010, pp. 130-139). 
Furthermore, the focus on violence against women should not detract from the 
applicability of intersectional integrity as a framework for understanding violations 
based on multiple identities. It should be equally applicable to, even if not directly 
representative of, all genders and transgender within the category of ‘gender 
violence’ and not just those classified as women per se. At the same time, the 
suggested normative framework can be applied more broadly to other forms of 
violence occurring on intersectional basis, for example, against disabled men or gay 
men. The references in this paper should then be treated as examples which are 
capable of being extrapolated for explaining the qualitative experience of gender 
violence, and in fact violence per se, for anyone with multiple and intersecting 
identities as women, Dalits, Blacks, gays, lesbians, disabled, young, old, poor, 
rural, immigrants etc. It is only with this unexceptional commitment, that we can 
lift one and all in climbing the ladder of gender justice.  
2. Intersectionality theory and gender violence 
Intersectionality theory seeks to understand the disadvantage associated with 
status-identities as based on multiple and intersecting grounds of race, sex, 
gender, disability, class, age, caste, religion, sexual orientation, region etc. 
Intersectionality was first translated in the legal realm by Kimberlé Crenshaw in her 
1989 article (Crenhsaw 1989), with the aspiration of addressing intersectional 
disadvantage through discrimination law. Initially developed in the context of Black 
women in the United States, intersectionality has since been transported and 
applied widely transnationally and in relation to identities beyond gender, class and 
race. (Doucet and Siltanen 2008, Cooper et al. 2009, Casey and Taylor 2010, Chow 
2011). 
This part begins by explaining how Crenshaw used intersectionality theory to 
explain the nature of violence against Black women in her second article on 
intersectionality published in 1991 (Crenshaw 1991). I use the concept of a Venn 
diagram to explain the unique and shared dimensions of disadvantage captured by 
intersectionality theory. I also draw on the right to integrity identified in 
international human rights law to explain how it assists in conceptualizing 
intersectional gender violence in a complete manner. The purpose of this part is to 
sketch the normative foundation of ‘intersectional integrity’, using intersectionality 
theory as a basis for the Venn diagram and complementing it with the notion of 
‘integrity’, to understand the legal category of intersectional gender violence.   
2.1. Violence against women through the lens of intersectionality  
Crenshaw introduced intersectionality theory to show that any real commitment 
towards eliminating racism and patriarchy could not ignore those located at the 
intersections of both–i.e. Black women (Crenshaw 1989, p. 166). This was because 
Black women’s experiences were defined by the intersection of both blackness and 
femaleness and could not be explained exclusively in terms of either race or 
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gender. This meant that Black women shared experiences of sexism with white 
women or of racism with Black men, but also experienced being both Black and 
female in a unique way. The qualitative understanding of their disadvantage 
involved an appreciation of both the unique and shared dimensions, which cannot 
be understood exclusively, coincidentally or additively (King 1988). Thus, the 
compounded nature of disadvantage flowing from multiple identities could neither 
be deflated into the experiences of white women or Black men, nor could it be 
inflated into an uninteractive category of disadvantage of its own.  
Crenshaw used this central thesis to explain the differences in women’s experiences 
of violence (Crenshaw 1991). By using the examples of battering and rape, she 
considered “how the experiences of women of color are frequently the product of 
intersecting patterns of racism and sexism.” (Crenshaw 1991, pp. 1243-45) 
Crenshaw posited that:  
Where systems of race, gender, and class domination converge, as they do in the 
experiences of battered women of color, intervention strategies based solely on the 
experiences of women who do not share the same class or race backgrounds will be 
of limited help to women who because of race and class face different obstacles. 
(Crenshaw 1991, p. 1246)  
She presented a series of examples showing this qualitative difference in women’s 
experiences. One of the instances concerned the 1990 amendment to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (United States), which provided that a person who 
immigrated to the United States to marry a citizen or a permanent resident must 
remain ‘properly’ married for two years prior to applying for permanent resident 
status. This made spouses facing extreme forms of battering and domestic violence 
reluctant to either report the brutality or leave the partner, lest they lost the 
chance to apply for permanent status (Crenshaw 1991, p. 1247). To remedy this, 
the Congress enacted an exception for hardship caused by domestic violence. But 
the conditions for meeting this exception required formal evidence of domestic 
violence in the form of affidavits or reports from police or socio-medical persons. 
Immigrant women were far less capable of accessing such formalized procedures 
and hence rarely claimed the benefit of the exception. The lack of resources and 
cultural and language barriers limited the possibility that immigrant women either 
escaped domestic violence or successfully claimed under the exception (Crenshaw 
1991, pp. 1248-1249). This example shows how patterns of gender violence and 
disadvantage are not limited to gender but also involve immigrant status, race, 
religion, socio-economic status etc. As Crenshaw observed: “modest attempts to 
respond to certain problems can be ineffective when the intersectional location[s] of 
women [with intersectional identities] is not considered in fashioning the remedy...” 
(Crenshaw 1991, p. 1250)  
A chief takeaway from this example is that a provision meant to address gender 
violence against women cannot be effective when predicated solely on gender. It 
signifies that the experience of gender violence can structurally differ for women on 
the basis of their race, immigrant status, religion, region, caste and culture. In 
folding these diverse differences into ‘gender’, we create an inaccurate conception 
of violence against women. It is also clear that the experiences of violence against 
women cannot simply be reduced to a function of their race or religion alone 
without taking into account their gender. In this sense, the term ‘gender violence’ 
does both too much and too little. It does too much by seeking to represent 
violence against all women and at the same time doing too little by falling short of 
actually understanding the difference in the nature of violence experienced by 
women. Violence against women with intersectional identities then needs to be 
understood as ‘intersectional gender violence’ rather than solely ‘gender’ violence. 
What intersectionality does is that it highlights the interrelationship between 
multiple intersecting identities as creating both shared and unique dimensions of 
experience.  
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This point can be understood as a Venn diagram, which pictorially exhibits all finite 
relationships between intersecting elements. The several points of intersections 
depict not the aggregate or exclusive characteristics but a shared and unique 
confluence of interaction between the elements. For example, to map the patterns 
of violence against women of color, Crenshaw used intersectionality for 
demonstrating that violence against Black women is frequently a product of 
intersecting patterns of racism, sexism and poverty. If we depict violence against 
poor Black women as a Venn diagram, it is a product of intersecting patterns of 
experiences of three groups: women, black and poor.  
 
The whole circles B (Blacks), P (poor) and W (women) all intersect and together 
yield the portion X. This portion demonstrates shared properties of the three 
intersecting circles; and at the same time, it also depicts certain unique 
characteristics that are not shared with the non-intersecting portions b (Blacks who 
are neither women nor poor), p (economically disadvantaged who are neither Black 
nor women) and w (women who are neither Black nor poor). It also shows some 
shared characteristics with Black women who are not poor BnW, poor women who 
are not Black PnW and Blacks who are poor but not women BnP. However, the only 
way to fully comprehend the position of poor Black women is to take into 
consideration their whole identity yielded by these shared characteristics as well as 
the unique characteristics of their position X. This is the central thesis of 
intersectionality, which brings to light the unique and shared patterns of violations 
suffered by those with multiple and intersecting status-identities. This central thesis 
serves a diagnostic or evaluative function, i.e. it explains the causal basis of 
violence against women beyond their sex or gender and as based on other 
identities of race, caste, class, religion, sexual orientation, disability etc.  
2.2. Violence against women and intersectional integrity 
When gender violence is mapped in intersectional terms, it helps us use 
foundational categories (like gender) for understanding the interrelationships 
between intersecting identities (like race and gender; race, gender and class; race, 
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gender, class and disability etc). The purpose of changing the conception of gender 
violence by viewing it from an intersectional lens is to challenge the uni-
dimensional understanding of the nature of violence based on gender, but not only 
so—thus, classifying gender violence also on the basis of race, class, caste, region, 
religion, disability, sexual orientation, etc. One unarticulated premise of taking into 
account all relevant identities that form the claimant’s experience of gender 
violence is the importance of considering identities as a whole. The purpose of 
casting the lens of intersectionality will be incomplete if one or two or a fraction of 
the claimant’s status-identities are considered in forming some shared and unique 
patterns rather than considering all of them at the same time. This is because 
experiences of violations cannot be neatly segregated based on one or few of the 
identities. As Pothier explains:  
… as a woman with disability (visual impairment due to Albinism…I can never 
experience gender discrimination other than as a person with a disability; I can 
never experience disability discrimination other than as a woman. I cannot 
disaggregate myself nor can anyone who might be discriminating against me. I do 
not fit into discrete boxes of grounds of discrimination. Even when only one ground 
of discrimination seems to be relevant, it affects me as a whole person. (Pothier 
2001, p. 59)  
Thinking in terms of a Venn diagram allows us to view the result of intersections as 
a whole. For example, Black women’s experiences can only be considered when 
race and gender are taken together as a whole to reflect unique and shared 
dimensions of racism and sexism. Thus, a singular understanding based on sexism 
or racism alone or an additive understanding which clumps racism and sexism 
together or another combination of the fragments allows people to be either less 
than, some of or more than the whole—none of which represents their real position. 
As Grillo remarks: “This fragmenting of identity by legal analysis, a fragmenting 
entirely at odds with the concrete life of [a] woman, is the subject of the 
intersectionality critique.” (Grillo 1995, p. 17) Thus, to accurately reflect people’s 
lived experiences of multiple identities, a key implication of the intersectionality 
theory is its emphasis on treating people’s experiences as a whole for considering 
the unique and shared patterns of violations created by multiple and intersecting 
identities. This notion in intersectionality theory of viewing identities as a complete 
whole is reflected in the idea of ‘integrity’.  
“Integrity” has been traditionally recognized as a value underpinning the right 
against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (UDHR art 5, 
United Nations 1966, art 7, European Union 2000, art 3). However, its full reach is 
reflected in Article 17 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (“CRPD”), which specifically spoke in terms of a ‘right to integrity.’ 
The text of Article 17 guarantees persons with disabilities the right to respect for 
their physical and mental integrity on an equal basis with others. The reasoning 
behind the drafting of this text explains how this generalist language was meant to 
reaffirm the wholeness of disabled identity. Viewed as insufficient and lacking, 
persons with disabilities challenge the negative portrayal of their identities by 
substituting it with a positive assertion of the disabled body and life as complete. 
This understanding of integrity, in line with the semantic meaning of the term, 
undercuts the notions of disabled life as incomplete, abnormal, or deficient. Thus, 
integrity creates the space for asserting respect for bodies and lives dissimilar to 
our own (Fiedler 1993). At its core, it allows for breaking through the prism of 
“normal” and viewing people just as they are (Equality and Human Rights 
Commission 2010, p. 24). 
In this sense, the right to integrity in the legal discourse has evolved both as a right 
against physical and psychological violence and also as a right to whole identity. 
Both these dimensions squarely resonate with the issue of intersectional gender 
violence. Intersectional gender violence is about: (i) rejecting violations of bodily 
and mental integrity when perpetrated based on people’s multiple and intersecting 
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identities (intersectionality); and (ii) recognizing that violence should be understood 
as a whole taking into account unique and shared patterns of violations yielded by 
intersections of gender, race, caste, religion, disability, age, sexual orientation etc 
(integrity). The intersectional dimension shows the nature of gender violence as 
constructed by unique and shared patterns of experiences (as depicted in a Venn 
diagram); whilst the integrity dimension emphasizes that experiences of 
intersectional gender violence can only be understood in this way when considered 
as a whole. This bipartite framework of ‘intersectional integrity’ serves as the 
normative background for deconstructing the nature of intersectional gender 
violence. Its explanatory force provides an accessible and accurate way of 
understanding the category of intersectional gender violence. The next part 
proceeds from theory to practice and highlights the conceptual gap in redressing 
intersectional gender violence from the standpoint of intersectional integrity. 
3. Gender violence in International Law  
The commitment to address intersectional gender violence has increasingly gained 
traction in international law. In May 2008, an expert group (organized by the 
United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women and the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime) provided a report on good practices in legislation on 
violence against women. Noting the obligation of the UN member states to combat 
gender violence, the report provided concrete suggestions for enacting laws in the 
domestic sphere. It identified the legislative goal as: 
The goal of legislation on violence against women should be to prevent violence 
against women, to ensure investigation, prosecution and punishment of 
perpetrators, and to provide protection and support for complainants/survivors of 
violence. (United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime 2008, p. 5).  
It also identified the guiding principle of addressing gender violence as:  
[taking] into account the differential impact of measures on women according to 
their race, class, ethnicity, religion, disability, culture, indigenous or migrant status, 
legal status, age or sexual orientation. (United Nations Division for the 
Advancement of Women, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2008, p. 6).  
The Report went on to specifically mandate that the text of the laws:  
recognize that women’s experience of violence is shaped by factors such as their 
race, colour, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
marital status, sexual orientation, HIV/AIDS status, migrant or refugee status, age, 
or disability, and include targeted measures for particular groups of women, where 
appropriate. (United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2008, p. 14).  
It further recommended that legislations provide for collection of statistical data on 
violence against women disaggregated by sex, race, age, ethnicity and other 
relevant characteristics (United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2008, p. 24). These mandates have been 
reiterated in the UN Handbook For Legislation on Violence Against Women (United 
Nations 2010). Although not directly binding, these concrete suggestions 
demonstrate a commitment for combating intersectional gender violence. But what 
does this commitment reflect on the concept of intersectional gender violence and 
how do we understand the nature of such violence? It is important to bolster the 
commitment with an explanation of what is distinctive about intersectional gender 
violence. While intersectional gender violence continues to develop in the 
jurisprudence of UN treaty bodies (Bond 2003, Goldscheid and Liebowitz 2015), the 
CEDAW Committee jurisprudence is a particularly appropriate starting point to 
search for this explanation. With its focus on women, its treatment of intersectional 
gender violence can reveal how the Committee understands and addresses this 
category of violence.  
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The text of CEDAW does not explicitly recognize a right to be free from gender 
violence. Gender violence or sexual harassment has neither been mentioned in 
CEDAW as a facet of discrimination nor as a violation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of women. However, since General Recommendation No. 12 
(CEDAW 1989) titled “Violence Against Women,” the issue of gender violence has 
been squarely brought within the contours of CEDAW. General Recommendation 
No. 12 recognized for the first time that, the obligations under Articles 2, 5, 11, 12 
and 16 of CEDAW required “the States parties to act to protect women against 
violence of any kind occurring within the family, at the work place or in any other 
area of social life.” It mandated States to include in their reports, information on 
violence and on measures introduced to deal with it. General Recommendation No. 
19 (CEDAW 1992), also titled “Violence Against Women,” further addressed gender 
violence in a comprehensive way such that it stands as one of the most relevant 
texts on gender violence in CEDAW jurisprudence and in international law generally. 
The Committee explicates its clearest understanding of gender violence within 
CEDAW as:  
The Convention in article 1 defines discrimination against women. The definition of 
discrimination includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed 
against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. 
(CEDAW 1992, para 6) 
The Committee’s understanding of violence against women is that which is 
committed because of being a woman—thus identifying women’s gender as 
determinative in classifying violence against them as gender-based. Beginning with 
this foundational principle, General Recommendation No. 19 does not directly speak 
of gender violence against women perpetrated also on the basis of race, caste, 
region, disability, age etc. In a passing reference it indicates that poverty and 
unemployment may lead to exploitation and abuse of women but it does not specify 
how the nature of such exploitation and abuse is compounded by the intersection of 
identities (CEDAW 1992, paras 14-15). It further indicates that certain traditions 
and cultures may perpetuate patterns of violence and abuse against women, 
especially pregnant women, young girls or rural women (CEDAW 1992, paras 20-
21). But this falls short of conveying that cultures and traditions often dictate the 
nature of violence against women and define it in terms that are both similar to and 
different from violence predicated only on women’s gender. General 
Recommendation No. 28 goes further in explicitly recognizing intersectionality as a 
form of discrimination broadly in these terms:  
Intersectionality is a basic concept for understanding the scope of the general 
obligations of States parties contained in article 2. The discrimination of women 
based on sex and gender is inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, 
such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste and 
sexual orientation and gender identity. Discrimination on the basis of sex or gender 
may affect women belonging to such groups to a different degree or in different 
ways to men. States parties must legally recognize such intersecting forms of 
discrimination and their compounded negative impact on the women concerned and 
prohibit them. (CEDAW 2010, para 18)  
While it does not mention intersectionality in its discussion on gender violence in 
reference to General Recommendation No. 19 (CEDAW 2010, para 19), if read 
together, the two General Recommendations can be interpreted as speaking in 
terms of prohibition, prevention and redressal of intersectional gender violence. The 
CEDAW Committee jurisprudence too has progressively shown signs of suitably 
grappling with intersectionality. Whilst the early jurisprudence often stuck to 
focusing on women’s gender alone, later cases took into account multiple identities 
of victims, especially in a way that shows an appreciation of the framework of 
intersectional integrity. Some examples are in order.  
In AT v Hungary (2003) the facts indicated an interdependent and cyclical 
relationship between the claimant’s condition of being economically dependent, a 
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single parent of a disabled child and the patterns of domestic violence this yielded. 
The complaint detailed four years of extreme battering by the claimant’s husband, 
which was not just a result of the claimant’s gender but also of being a poor single 
parent and an estranged spouse. The Committee held that Hungary had violated 
Article 2(a), (b) and (e) of CEDAW read with General Recommendation No. 19 by 
failing in its obligations to prevent and protect women from violence. The reasoning 
behind this finding briefly alluded to the claimant’s vulnerability as a single mother 
of a disabled child in paragraph 9.4: “She has been unable to flee to a shelter 
because none are equipped to accept her together with her children, one of whom 
is fully disabled.” This reference to intersectionality did not pan beyond the lone 
sentence and did not inform the specific recommendations made by the Committee 
to address in particular the situation of women like the claimant who needed 
measures similar to all women facing domestic abuse but also those which catered 
to their unique position as economically dependent estranged spouses with disabled 
children. This was in spite of the record, which showed a clear connection between 
the claimant’s experiences and her multiple identities. The inability to pursue 
effective legal remedies in time or to escape to a shelter because none catered to a 
mentally disabled child were centrally connected to disadvantage accruing from 
poverty and disability of her child. In reducing this connection to a cursory mention, 
the Committee failed in appreciating the demands of both intersectionality and 
integrity—(i) understanding and describing the nature of intersectional gender 
violence as it created unique and shared patterns of vulnerability based on gender, 
class, marital status and disability, i.e. reckoning with the unique position of 
disadvantage of a single mother of a disabled child and also how it related to single 
mothers, disabled and economically vulnerable groups; (ii) respecting the integrity 
of the claimant and treating her as a whole in appreciating her experiences rather 
than just as a woman. In the absence of this exercise which draws causal 
connections with multiple identities of the claimant as a whole, the Committee’s 
recommendations such as improving access to free legal assistance and better 
shelter and counseling services, remained generalist and imprecise. The focus of 
the recommendations remained the single identity category of gender without an 
appreciation of how women with other disadvantaging identities experience gender 
violence in a way that is both similar to but different from women who are 
disadvantaged only on the basis of gender. This resembles Crenshaw’s example of 
the immigration exception under the US law which failed to cater to the 
constituency of battered immigrant women, who were perhaps most in need of its 
protection. The takeaway from both these examples is the same: in the absence of 
understanding how gender violence accrues on an intersectional basis, we may fail 
to address it as well.    
It is arguable that this is an inevitable result of the single-axis focus on women in 
CEDAW. However, the focus on women and their sex-based disadvantage cannot be 
overstated as a justification of gender-exclusive analysis when gender-based 
violations themselves are based on other status-identities. Such a delimited view of 
CEDAW jurisprudence would be unsustainable in the light of its object and purpose 
of affirming the recognition, enjoyment and exercise of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms by women. (CEDAW 1979, preamble, article 1) Thus, the 
lack of appreciation of intersectional gender violence as gender violence in early 
CEDAW jurisprudence may have resulted from CEDAW’s avowed focus on women, 
but cannot be justified within its broad and inclusive mandate. But AT v Hungary 
was only first in the line of cases which took a gender-exclusive view of violence. 
Another example is of AS v Hungary (2005), which involved a complaint from a 
Roma woman who was subjected to coerced sterilization by medical staff at a 
Hungarian hospital. Violence in medical procedures including forced sterilization has 
been recognized within General Recommendation No. 19. Despite the structural 
discrimination and violence against Roma women in Europe, especially in the form 
of forced sterilisation, the Committee’s decision failed to particularize the gender 
violence in this instance as shaped by the claimant’s identity of being not just 
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Roma, but also mother of three children and pregnant with her fourth, lacking in 
literacy and education (she did not understand the term ‘sterilization’ until 
explained after it was performed) and suffering from depression. Even as the 
claimant pointed to her especially vulnerable position as a Roma and a mother in 
distress due to her complicated pregnancy and delivery, the Committee did not 
consider how the violations were a product of her vulnerable position as a whole. It 
recalled in relation to General Recommendation No. 19:  
The sterilization surgery was performed on the author without her full and informed 
consent and must be considered to have permanently deprived her of her natural 
reproductive capacity. Accordingly, the Committee finds the author’s rights under 
article 16, paragraph 1 (e) to have been violated. (AS v Hungary (2005), para 9.4)  
The nature of violation was then held to be based on gender only, discounting how 
full and informed consent was compromised due to the author’s intersectional 
identity and not just gender. Relevant facts such as being ill-informed because she 
was Roma and the aggravating circumstance of a complicated pregnancy and 
delivery vitiated her full and informed consent. The absence of accounting for these 
facts by appreciating how they yielded unique and shared dimensions of violations 
(intersectionality) by treating the claimant as a whole (integrity) is not just 
disappointing but diminishing of the CEDAW Committee’s commitment to address 
gender violence.  
Similarly, in NSF v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (2005), 
the author of the communication was a Pakistani asylum seeker and a mother of 
two children, living in the United Kingdom. Her deportation exposed her and her 
two children to fear of violence at the hands of her former husband in Pakistan. 
During her six years of marriage in Pakistan, she was subjected to continued 
domestic violence and marital rape, which eventually led her to seek divorce and 
escape to a nearby village. When her husband arrived with men armed with knives 
and threatened to kill her, the author managed to flee the country and apply for 
asylum in the UK. She appealed the refusal of her asylum application on grounds 
that it violated the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. After pursuing a series of 
appeals and procedures, the author finally brought a complaint under the CEDAW 
optional protocol protesting the refusal of asylum. She based her complaint on her 
specific vulnerability as a woman, from a developing country, as a single mother 
and a divorcee facing threats of violence from her former husband (NSF v United 
Kingdom 2005, para 3.1). Although the complaint pertained to the asylum decision 
and was held inadmissible, the Committee went ahead to observe that the 
communication raised: “the issue of the situation in which women who have fled 
their country because of fear of domestic violence often find themselves.” It 
recalled that in General Recommendation No. 19, the Committee had posited that: 
“the definition of discrimination against women in article 1 of the Convention 
includes gender-based violence, i.e. violence that is directed against a woman 
because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately.” (NSF v United 
Kingdom 2005, para 7.3). Once again, despite being asked to consider the specific 
implications of other identities that transformed the nature of gender violence, the 
Committee applied a uni-dimensional understanding of gender in denying the 
admissibility of the claim.  
This is a recurring pattern in a catena of CEDAW Committee decisions which bear 
out the interrelationship of violence with gender, poverty, immigrant status and 
single parenthood, such as in YC v Denmark (2014), SO v Canada (2014), Isatou 
Jallow v Bulgaria (2012), Guadalupe Herrera Rivera v Canada (2011) and MPM v 
Canada (2010). Whilst the CEDAW Committee often recapitulated and noted the 
facts in relation to multiple identities of the claimants, it did not evaluate the nature 
of harm from this intersectional perspective but only in light of the predominant 
strand of gender. Thus, the CEDAW Committee lagged in driving home the point 
that what we call gender violence is not just a matter of gender alone. It becomes 
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evident that: (i) there have been frequent and clear examples of intersectional 
gender violence which have been rendered invisible because (ii) even where noted, 
the Committee missed the importance of multiple and intersecting identities as 
“part and parcel of the cause and consequences of gender violence” (Goldscheid 
and Liebowitz 2015, p. 309). This void divulges the need for a framework like 
intersectional integrity in deconstructing the nature of intersectional gender 
violence in law. At least two examples from the later CEDAW Committee 
jurisprudence justifies the relevance of this framework in the systematic 
appreciation of cases of intersectional gender violence. Kell v Canada (2012) and 
RPB v Philippines (2014) provide worthwhile cues for appreciating such violence by 
applying the normative framework of intersectional integrity within the text of 
CEDAW and its General Recommendations. 
Kell v Canada (2012) provides a breakthrough in its treatment of intersectional 
gender violence. The Committee’s opinion marks an important departure in terms 
of taking intersectional gender violence seriously by recognizing how it is distinct 
and how it must be addressed. Cecilia Kell, an aboriginal woman, had suffered 
economic and domestic abuse and violence at the hands of her civil partner William 
Senych. Kell and Senych were co-owners of property, which was specifically 
earmarked for the Rae-Edzo community, to which Kell belonged. Senych was not 
otherwise entitled to this property other than as a co-owner with Kell. Some years 
later, without Kell’s knowledge, Senych had her removed as co-owner of the 
property. Following a lengthy and unsuccessful legal process of challenging her 
fraudulent removal from the property, Kell approached the CEDAW Committee 
seeking a finding that Canada had discriminated against her on the grounds of sex, 
marital status and cultural heritage. In its first such unequivocal statement the 
Committee held that:  
The Committee considers that the author has established a distinction based on the 
fact that she was an aboriginal woman victim of domestic violence, which she 
clearly submitted in her first lawsuit against her partner, and that such violence had 
the effect of impairing the exercise of her property rights…Accordingly, the 
Committee finds that an act of intersectional discrimination has taken place against 
the author. (Kell, para 10.2)  
The statement makes clear that the Committee’s evaluation of the claim 
appreciated both the dimensions of intersectionality and integrity in tracing unique 
and shared patterns by taking a full and complete view of the claimant’s identity as 
an aboriginal woman. Whilst the Committee did not describe these patterns at 
length, the intersectional standpoint is fleshed out fully in the Committee’s 
recommendations. It mandated that the steps Canada must take to address 
discrimination in relation to ownership of property should relate to intersectional 
discrimination specifically, taking into account aboriginal women like Kell. (Kell, 
para 10.3) For example, the Committee recommended recruiting and training of 
more Aboriginal women to provide legal aid and reviewing the legal aid system to 
ensure Aboriginal women who are survivors of domestic violence have effective 
access to justice. Subsequent cases such as RPB v Philippines (2014) show a similar 
engagement with the framework of intersectional integrity as Kell.  
In RPB, the author of the communication was a woman who was poor and deaf-
mute. She was raped and the accused was acquitted in proceedings before a 
Philippines’ trial court. She was barred from challenging the acquittal under 
Philippines law based on double jeopardy. The author claimed before the CEDAW 
Committee that the acquittal was erroneous because, inter alia, the trial court had 
“failed to consider the rape in the context of her vulnerability as a deaf girl.” (RPB, 
para 3.1) She argued that the Philippine justice system employed discriminatory 
gender myths and stereotypes in adjudicating rape cases from the standpoint of an 
imaginary “ordinary Filipina” and not in reference to real victims like her (RPB, para 
3.8). In relation to her own intersectional position, she pointed out that the trial 
court had applied a stereotypical understanding of rape scenario, which did not 
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incorporate the experience of a deaf minor girl. The behavioral responses of the 
author as a disabled girl, and her inability to convey that there was no consent, 
were different from the facts in cases involving non-disabled women. (RPB, paras 
3.2-3.4) The trial court’s finding that “being a deaf mute does not render her 
incapable of creating noise [or …] resist[ing] the aggression,” disregarded how a 
deaf-mute victim would respond to and resist rape. In addition, she claimed that 
the absence of sign language interpretation and post-trauma counseling or support 
services contributed to the serious irregularities in the justice delivery system. 
(RPB, paras 3.9-3.10). She further explained that:  
deaf women, especially girls, occupy a difficult position in Philippine society because 
they are disadvantaged both to men (men with or without disability, including 
deafness) and women (women without or with disability other than deafness). In 
addition, deaf women and girls, who are victims of sexual violence, often suffer 
from poverty and lack access to formal education. (RPB, para 3.8)  
The Committee agreed with all of author’s claims and explained its perspective on 
the issue as:  
In the particular case, the compliance of the State party’s obligation to banish 
gender stereotypes on the grounds of article 2 (f) needs to be assessed in the light 
of the level of gender, age and disability sensitivity applied in the judicial handling 
of the author’s case. (RPB, para 8.8)  
It is clear that this case was framed primarily as a matter of intersectional gender 
violence where the author elaborately explained her violations through the lens of 
her whole identity as a deaf-mute minor girl. The Committee’s favorable treatment 
of her case kept stride with the claimant’s formulation in appreciating intersectional 
gender violence in this way: it traced the shared patterns of gender violence with 
women (RPB, para 8.9, 8.10), women with disabilities in relation to General 
Recommendation No. 18 (RPB, paras 8.3, 8.6 8.7) and particularly for the claimant 
as a young deaf-mute girl (RPB, paras 8.5, 8.8). The full consideration of the 
multiple and intersecting forms of violence at play in RPB is reflected in the 
Committee’s description of the author’s claim, its own response on the merits of the 
claim and also its final recommendations (RPB, para 9). For example, the 
Committee specifically mandated the State party to:  
[e]nsure that all criminal proceedings involving rape and other sexual offences are 
conducted in an impartial and fair manner and free from prejudices or stereotypical 
notions regarding the victim’s gender, age and disability. (RPB, para 9(b)(iii))  
Kell and RPB thus provide useful examples of how the Committee’s evaluative work 
can be channeled towards understanding and responding to intersectional nature of 
gender violence with the perspective of intersectional integrity. Even though the 
Committee did not operate within the so-called theoretical framework of 
intersectional integrity, its normative underpinnings visible in Kell and RPB can be 
explained in reference to it. The significance of this trend is a diagnostic one—that 
is, it helps to trace, explain and address the reasons for gender violence by 
systematically accounting for multiple status-identities in the experience of gender 
violence, which in turn affects the assessment of and remedies awarded in a claim.  
4. Intersectional gender violence in India 
With the backdrop of the theoretical framework of intersectional integrity and the 
CEDAW Committee’s consideration of individual communications on intersectional 
gender violence, I now turn to consider the discourse in India. This part is divided 
into four sections. 4.1 considers three examples—the gang rapes of Mathura and 
Bhanwari Devi, and violence against Muslim women in the 2002 Gujarat riots. The 
following two sections engage with two key texts which have dealt with 
intersectional gender violence in India—4.2 considers the strides made in the NGO 
Shadow Reports submitted to the CEDAW Committee, and 4.3 discusses the Justice 
Verma committee report and its treatment of intersectionality. Finally, 4.4 
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consolidates the learnings from these examples and reaffirms the explanatory force 
of the framework in uncovering the nature of intersectional gender violence.  
4.1. Three examples 
This section discusses three significant cases of intersectional gender violence and 
argues that they were exclusively but erroneously interrogated through the lens of 
gender alone. The loss in reducing these cases to ‘gender’ violence is in failing to 
accurately identify and address the nature of violence suffered. 
In the case of Tukaram v State of Maharashtra (1979), Mathura, a sixteen-year-old 
tribal girl had come to register a complaint against her brother, who was harassing 
her about her relationship with her boyfriend. She was gang raped by policemen in 
the compound of the police station. Whilst the Nagpur bench of the Bombay High 
Court convicted the two policemen, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and 
dismissed both the circumstantial evidence as well as the testimony of Mathura, 
calling it “a concoction” and “a tissue of lies.” (Tukaram (1979), p. 817) Outraged 
by the judgment, activists demanded change in evidentiary requirements in rape 
cases but did not touch upon why Mathura’s testimony was disbelieved and 
disregarded, something centrally linked to the specific vulnerability of poor, minor 
and lower-caste women—facts that were left unaccounted in the judgment. The 
Criminal Law Amendment Act 1983 amended the Indian Penal Code, the Code of 
Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act with respect to matters like 
custodial rape, making it an offence to reveal the identity of rape victims, changed 
the burden of proof to be on the accused when the woman claims that she did not 
consent and, deleted the provision referring to the character of the prosecutrix in a 
rape case (Indian Penal Code 1860, s 228A, s 375, s 376, s 376A etc; Indian 
Evidence Act 1892, s 114A). But the legislative changes did not address the 
systemic nature of sexual exploitation of poor Dalit and tribal women and in turn 
normalized it by failing to give any attention to class/caste/tribe in addressing 
custodial gender violence (Bhagwat 1995, p. 6) which was at the heart of Mathura’s 
case. The judicial and legislative characterization of Mathura’s case as one simply of 
custodial ‘gender’ violence, missed how patriarchy modifies its character in relation 
to age, poverty and caste. It failed at both levels of the framework of intersectional 
integrity—in occluding unique and shared patterns of violations associated with 
multiple and intersecting status-identities (in this case, of gender, class, caste and 
age); and in failing to treat the claimant as a whole (a young tribal woman) instead 
of only as a woman. The ultimate failure is one of failing to diagnose and address 
intersectional gender violence as gender violence at all.  
Similarly, Bhanwari Devi’s gang rape was exclusively gender-ized despite the clear 
caste basis of the violations as a Dalit woman. Bhanwari Devi worked as a ‘saathin’ 
(friend) grassroots worker employed as part of the Women’s Development Project 
in the state of Rajasthan. She campaigned in her village against child marriage and 
had tried to frustrate the wedding of a nine-month old girl in a powerful upper-
caste Gurjar family. In retaliation, she was gang raped by the upper-caste Gurjar 
men to penalize her for blocking the child marriage in their family. The lower court 
dismissed the complaint on the basis that upper-caste men could not possibly have 
raped a Dalit woman. The issue was taken up by activists who demanded protection 
of women from sexual harassment at workplaces. While justice for Bhanwari Devi 
remains elusive with the criminal appeal still pending in Rajasthan High Court, 
activists expedited their relief through public interest litigation in regards sexual 
harassment through a separate matter brought to the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court began addressing the petition, which finally resulted in the Sexual 
Harassment in Workplace Guidelines, as:  
The immediate cause for the filing of this writ petition is an incident of alleged 
brutal gang rape of social worker in a village of Rajasthan. That incident is the 
subject matter of a separate criminal action and no further mention of it, by us, is 
necessary. (Vishaka 1995, p. 3011).  
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The characterization of the petition stemming from Bhanwari Devi’s gang rape as 
merely a case of sexual harassment rather than as sexual assault or rape 
perpetrated on the basis of caste, is a glaring omission in the understanding of her 
violations. Turning her case into a general matter of ‘gender equality’ (Vishaka 
1995, p. 3011), not only hijacks a test case which really belonged to Dalit women, 
but also fails in fulfilling the promise of realizing gender justice for all women. Even 
the Supreme Court Guidelines on Sexual Harassment did not specifically address 
the situation of Dalit women like Bhanwari Devi who were targeted because of their 
intersectional identity as Dalit women. Without directly addressing the nature of 
harm involved in sexual assault and harassment against Dalit women, cases like 
Mathura’s or Bhanwari Devi’s will continue to be mischaracterized (rape devolving 
into sexual harassment), disbelieved (the credence given to a Dalit women’s 
complaint and testimony) and ultimately discarded (dismissing the possibility that 
upper-caste men can and do perpetuate sexual violence against Dalit women). The 
legal discourse around these two cases reveals the persisting sidelining of caste, 
tribe, poverty and age as gender issues. 
Finally, consider the systemic violence perpetrated against Muslim women during 
the 2002 Gujarat riots. As reported by Human Rights Watch:  
Muslim women and girls in Gujarat were stripped and paraded naked, gang-raped, 
mutilated and burnt alive. Iron rods and other objects were inserted into their 
bodies. In some cases, the police reportedly opened fire on Muslim men who tried 
to save them. (Human Rights Watch 2003, p. 22).  
The communal riots between Muslims and Hindus did not just stop at mob violence 
but extended to afflicting the bodies of innocent women and children of both 
communities. Since the concept of honor of the community is bound to the chastity 
and respect of women’s bodies, sexual violence against Muslim women was pursued 
as the obvious strategy of directly wounding the pride of an entire community. As 
the report of International Initiative for Justice remarks:  
The specific targeting of women [was a] part of a conscious strategy to terrorize 
the Muslim population of Gujarat…sexual violence played a fundamental role and 
was used ‘as an engine of the mobilisation of hatred and destruction.’ (International 
Initiative for Justice Report 2003)  
Thus, the bodies of Muslim women became the battleground of rioting. They were 
targeted not only because they were women but because they belonged to a 
particular community, that they were Muslim. The resulting brutalities, even if vast 
and persistent, were neither reported nor documented officially. In fact, the report 
of the three-member committee appointed by the National Commission of Women 
did not delve into violence against Muslim women in Gujarat riots. The 
marginalisation of such large-scale violence against Muslim women (as compared to 
violence against Hindu women which was considerably better reported and 
addressed), strikes at the core of the problem here—that in the absence of a 
theoretical framework we fail to not only understand and address such violence but 
also fail to identify it as problematic at all. The lack of attention to violence against 
Muslim women veiled the nature of their violations as simply another instance of 
communal violence rather than as an intersectional issue of gender justice. (Human 
Rights Watch 2003, p. 10). 
4.2. The departures in shadow reports  
Although neither binding nor official, the Second NGO Shadow Report submitted to 
the CEDAW Committee (NAWO 2006) marked a departure point for Indian activists 
to discuss publicly and widely the disturbing reality of intersectional gender violence 
in India before the CEDAW Committee. The Report was coordinated by National 
Alliance of Women and edited by the leading academic and activist, Kalpana 
Kannabiran. Broadly, the issues of the Shadow Report concerned the condition of 
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women but especially gender violence considered in light of the CEDAW General 
Recommendation No. 19. The Shadow Report noted that:  
Constitutional and legislative provisions that have been enacted to protect women 
from discrimination have not proved to be an effective deterrent. There remains a 
high incidence of gender-based violence against women, which takes even more 
extreme forms because of customary practices (e.g. dowry, sati, devadasi); 
extreme forms of physical and sexual violence and harassment against women who 
belong to particular castes or ethnic or religious groups... (NAWO 2006, pp. 216-
17).  
In this light, the Report did not engage with gender violence generally but nuanced 
the instances and experiences based on various status-identities, which affected 
violence against women. The intersectional position of Dalit, tribal, indigenous, 
Muslim, disabled, homosexual, HIV+, poor, employed or unemployed, single or 
married women were all specifically considered as giving rise to distinct violations 
within the broad spectrum of gender violence. Specific attention was given to 
women in vulnerable situations like the Gujarat riots, tsunami disaster and women 
in armed conflict in the North East.  
For example, in relation to Dalit women, the Report asserted:  
Dalit women ‘face targeted violence from state actors and powerful members of 
dominant castes and community especially in the case of rape, mutilation, and 
death; they face…gender violence at the workplace that includes fields [as 
agricultural labourers], on the streets [as manual scavengers and garbage pickers], 
in homes [as domestic workers], and through religious custom.’ (NAWO 2006, pp. 
28-9).  
It further explained the position of Dalit women as “dalit among dalits” since they 
are thrice alienated on the basis of their caste, class and gender. (NAWO 2006, p. 
29). For economically disadvantaged women, it observed: “Poor women in slums 
experience enormous and unacceptable levels of violence in their daily lives in the 
family, community, work place and public place.” (NAWO 2006, p. 211). It also 
noted that disability compounds the experience of disadvantage and expounds the 
nature of violence against disabled women. (NAWO 2006, p. 220). These 
formulations of intersectional gender violence come close to the framework of 
intersectional integrity by considering women as a whole and in terms of all of their 
relevant disadvantaging status-identities and in considering the qualitative nature 
of experiences which are unique but also shared with others similarly placed. Thus, 
even as the Shadow Report noted that: “Gender-based violence is psychological, 
physical or sexual violence that is rooted in the power differential between men and 
women,” it is clear that it does not only take it to be rooted therein and there are 
clear explanations, like those highlighted above, as to how gender violence is also 
predicated upon other identities.  
While the Shadow Report regretted the “non-recognition of the intersectional nature 
of discrimination, compounded by the non-inclusion of crucial measures that 
sharpen discrimination against women” (NAWO 2006, p. 29), it simultaneously 
prepared the groundwork for recognizing the intersectional nature of discrimination 
and violence against women. The meticulous detailing of experiences of violence of 
women who are not upper-caste, middle class, heterosexual and non-disabled 
provided the key to recognizing a broader range of gender violence experiences. It 
highlighted the structural complexity of intersectional gender violence and hence 
provided the explanatory and evidentiary basis needed to apply a framework like 
intersectional integrity. In fact, the latest Shadow Report to the CEDAW Committee 
in its 58th Session compiled by Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom focused on the three issues of Gujarat riots, militarization and gun 
violence and violence by armed forces in conflict areas in largely similar terms 
(Women’s International League for Peace & Freedom 2014). The work in the Second 
Shadow report thus remains a leading example in its exploration of intersectional 
Shreya Atrey   Lifting as We Climb… 
 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 5, n. 6 (2015), 1512-1535 
ISSN: 2079-5971 1529 
gender violence and a clear demonstration of how integrity and intersectionality are 
to be pursed together to explain the phenomena by speaking of uniqueness, 
sameness and wholeness of experiences in the same breath.  
4.3. Intersectionality and Justice Verma Committee report 
The national awakening after the horrific gang rape of Jyoti Singh Pandey in 2013 
devolved into a clamor for legal reform. A three member Committee headed by 
Justice Verma was constituted on 23 December 2013 “to look into possible 
amendments to the Criminal Law to provide for quicker trial and enhanced 
punishment for criminals committing sexual assault of extreme nature against 
women.” (Verma et al. 2013) The 657-page report was submitted on 23 January 
2013 and marks a breakthrough in women’s movement in India.  
The Report considered broad questions on the condition of women in India by 
tackling major issues like sexual assault and rape, sexual harassment, child abuse, 
khap panchayats (informal dispute settlement bodies in villages which are 
conservative and lawless) and honor killings. Despite the vast breadth and depth of 
the Committee Report, the overarching theme that inspired the progressive 
thinking seems to have been the epithet of gender equality enshrined in the 
Constitution of India. The Committee remarked:  
We wish to base a large number of our conclusions on the theory of the 
Constitution. The actions of those in authority have been in conflict with 
constitutional theory under which citizens of India are entitled to equality. We wish 
to say that equality is the bedrock of the Constitution. (Verma et al. 2013, p. 24)  
It further drew the connection between women’s inequality and Constitutional 
ideals as:  
If true empowerment of women were to mean anything, it is necessary that law, as 
well as public policy, must be capable of engaging substantially with women’s 
rights, opportunities, acquisition of skills, the ability to generate self-confidence and 
insist on total equality in relationships, both with society and the State. It is the 
inability of women to claim equality in society which has led to a slant against 
women as a consequence of which there has been a latent bias against women in 
the prosecution of crimes including its prevention. (Verma et al. 2013, pp. 8-9)  
With such background values, the Committee sought to address the issue of gender 
violence in India. This section does not address all of the Committee’s observations 
in the Report, even as they remain significant; it only discusses the Committee’s 
handling of intersectionality, to understand the way in which the Committee 
conceptualized intersectional gender violence. What comes through in this survey is 
that, although the Committee made several sporadic references to violence 
perpetrated against women based on class, caste, religion or disability, it did not 
squarely identify the nature of such gender violence as a matter of intersectional 
integrity, i.e. by qualitatively appreciating the identity of victims as a whole to 
explain what is unique about such violence and how it relates to gender-based 
violence and other forms of violence based on status-identities.  
The Report is rife with references to intersectionality, speaking frequently of women 
of caste or minority religions. In tune with the general tenor of the Report, these 
references relate more closely to the broader concerns of gender equality and 
justice. Thus, the Committee promotes inter-caste and inter-religion marriages 
(Verma et al. 2013, pp. 228-29) and reproaches honor killings and khap 
panchayats for derogating women’s rights (Verma et al. 2013, p. 225). Women and 
children with disabilities find appropriate mention when the Committee is speaking 
of the state acting as parens patriae (Verma et al. 2013, pp. 39, 66, 420) for 
establishing protective homes and institutions (Verma et al. 2013, pp. 197, 223, 
269, 270) as well as special counseling services (Verma et al. 2013, pp. 273-74) 
and revising court procedures for ensuring accessibility (Verma et al. 2013, p. 295, 
416). In relation to elderly women, the Committee spoke directly in terms of their 
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“right to freedom from violence, including sexual abuse, discrimination based on 
age and the right to be treated with dignity” (Verma et al. 2013, p. 232) As regards 
women of caste, the Committee drew upon the connections with the “inequities of 
social status, caste prejudices, and economic deprivation [which] further compound 
the gender injustice” (Verma et al. 2013, p. 14). The Report referred to the cases 
of Mathura and Bhanwari Devi (Tukaram 1979, Vishaka 1995) but made no specific 
reference to the claimants’ caste, once again sidelining an important aspect of the 
nature of sexual violence perpetrated against them. In relation to Bhanwari Devi, 
the Report stated: 
Despite the well-known Bhanwari Devi case, which led to the Vishakha judgment, 
full justice continues to elude the victim of sexual harassment and sexual assault 
even after two decades… The most appalling feature of the case is that the trial 
court acquitted the accused observing that the rapists were middle-aged and 
respectable persons of a higher caste who could not have raped a lower caste 
woman. The mindset of the judiciary also needs to be improved by their education 
in gender sensitivity. The women’s tragedy is to face the compounding of gender 
and social injustice… (Verma et al. 2013, pp. 14-15)  
Even as the Report came close to identifying caste as a function in the equation of 
gender violence, it did not tease out the point any further to deconstruct the 
systemic nature of gender violence perpetrated on the basis of caste. Other than 
the bare mention of Bhanwari Devi’s caste, the Report went no further in explaining 
how caste actually changed the nature of violence against her—such that the gang 
rape could not solely be described as a matter of ‘gender’ violence.  
The clearest attempt to address intersectionality is visible at page 38 of the Report 
where the Committee remarked:  
If there has to be a society which is based on equality of gender, we must ensure 
that not only does a woman not suffer on account of gender but also not suffer on 
account of caste or religion in addition. Thus a woman may suffer a double 
disadvantage – a) because she is a woman, and b) because she belongs to a 
caste/tribe/community/religion which is disadvantaged, she stands at a dangerous 
intersection if poor. (Verma et al. 2013, p. 38)  
Whilst facially going beyond gender, the way Committee used other identities to 
explain gender inequality is problematic. The view that disadvantage associated 
with intersection of identities can be expressed distinctly or as a sum (‘double 
disadvantage’) of the individual disadvantages is at odds with the framework of 
intersectional integrity which resists fragmentation and mathematical 
representation of violations and insists on considering multiple intersecting 
identities as a whole by qualitatively unpacking the unique and shared dimensions 
of violations. For example, the experience of being a Muslim woman can only be 
explained in reference to the whole identity of being both Muslim and woman—
which is not simply the additive result of being a Muslim man and a Hindu woman. 
Adrien Katharine Wing explains this powerfully in relation to Black women: “the 
experiences of black women…might reflect the basic mathematical equation that 
one times one truly does equal one…[Their] experiences…must be seen as 
multiplicative, multi-layered, indivisible whole...” (Wing 1991, pp. 181-2, 200) 
The Committee’s reference to “compoundedness” of vulnerabilities is certainly an 
improvement over its additive understanding, as it remarked:  
Thus, complaints of rape become mere matters of formality - low on priority 
because there is no understanding of the acuteness of the violation of human rights 
in respect of a woman by sexual assault and the psychological trauma she 
undergoes. This is compounded by vulnerabilities emanating from 
class/caste/community disadvantages and also that of poverty. (Verma et al. 2013, 
p. 44)  
However, the Report did not pursue the claim any further and avoids an 
explanation of how intersectionality actually creates “compounded” vulnerabilities.   
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The final recommendations from the Committee suggests a legislative provision 
worded as: “No woman shall be unfairly discriminated on grounds of gender 
including … discrimination by virtue of a woman belonging to another sub-sect of 
caste, religion, region or race.” (Verma et al. 2013, p. 431) This formulation seems 
to endorse intersectionality. However, without an explanation of what it means to 
experience “discrimination by virtue of…belonging to another sub-sect of caste, 
religion, region or race,” the Committee does not lay down the groundwork for 
recognizing gender violence against all women. Thus, it is not surprising then that 
the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2013, which implemented several of the 
Committee’s recommendations on provisions relating to sexual offences in the 
Indian Penal Code 1860, Indian Evidence Act 1872, and Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973, did not touch upon intersectional gender violence. It added new 
offences such as acid attacks, voyeurism, stalking and amended the definitions of 
rape and trafficking, but did not reflect on the consequence of these offences when 
committed because of a claimant’s race, caste, disability, age, sexual orientation, in 
addition to gender. In this sense, the strides made in the Shadow Reports in 
revealing the incidence and nature of intersectional gender violence, and cursorily 
referred to in the Justice Verma Committee Report, were ultimately missed by the 
crucial Criminal Law Amendment Act 2013, and since remain wanting in the official 
prose on gender violence in India.  
4.4. Addressing intersectional gender violence through intersectional integrity 
This paper has considered the normative framework for understanding what I have 
termed “intersectional gender violence,” i.e. violence perpetrated on the basis of 
combination of status-identities of gender, race, caste, religion, sexual orientation, 
age, disability etc. As the Indian and CEDAW Committee examples show, the lack of 
a systematic consideration of the nature of violence perpetrated based on multiple 
identities leads to an inaccurate portrayal of the experience of violence, which may 
negatively affect the chances of obtaining relief. Instead, an emphasis on the two 
dimensions of the framework allows a clear and comprehensive appraisal of the 
nature of such violence—first, by tracing the unique and shared patterns of 
violations based on multiple and intersecting identities (intersectionality); and 
secondly, by considering the claimant as a whole without splintering or lumping 
together the identities (integrity). Filtering the facts and evidence of gender 
violence through this framework allows us to accurately understand the category of 
intersectional gender violence, in order that it may be adequately addressed in law.  
The paper has this prepared the groundwork for future efforts in developing 
legislative formulations, adjudicative tests and policy measures for addressing 
intersectional gender violence based on an accurate understanding of the issue. 
This paper neither suggests such a formulation, nor considers practical matters 
such as where that type of amendment could be inserted, whether in the Indian 
Penal Code, the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 
1989 or the Domestic Violence Against Women (Prevention and Protection) Act 
2005. It also does not proffer amendments to court procedures and substantive 
legal tests for accommodating this conceptual understanding. In line with the aim 
of the paper to provide an explanatory account of how intersectional gender 
violence can be causally understood through a framework like intersectional 
integrity, the paper merely suggests the baseline legal commitment which 
accommodates the possibility of detecting and addressing intersectional gender 
violence.  
When asked about uniting our responses towards intersectionality, Toni Cade 
Bambara remarked: “the most effective way to do it, is to do it.” (Salaam 2007, p. 
63). If this is taken as the guiding principle for addressing intersectional gender 
violence, any general provision on or test of gender violence will have to be 
couched in intersectional terms. As the analysis in this paper sought to show, 
intersectional gender violence should be centrally located within the compass of 
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gender violence in a way that recognizes its true and complex character. This has 
been widely recognized in international law documents, which insist that definitional 
provisions include the fact that gender violence can also be based on race, religion, 
caste, sexual orientation, age, disability etc. The second consideration highlights 
the compounded effect of suffering gender violence based on status-identities other 
than gender, which not only transforms the experience but also aggravates it. This 
will lead to a recognition that, for example, if gender violence is predicated also 
upon religion or disability or both of them at the same time, it will give rise to a 
distinct and aggravated form of violation. A suggestion in this regard is the inclision 
of such language: “aggravated sexual assault includes sexual assault perpetrated 
on grounds of the complainant’s religion, race, caste, place of birth, age, disability, 
sexual orientation or any of them.” (Fredman 2013) A comprehensive legal reform 
project will have to do far more, for example, to account for intersectionality in 
sentencing and punishment, to include it in reference to all forms of violence, and 
to rethink evidentiary rules of proof etc. This project has laid the foundation for 
future efforts for addressing intersectional gender violence at all levels by 
expounding on its normative character.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper has outlined the theoretical framework of intersectional integrity for 
understanding the category of intersectional gender violence. It has charted the 
developments in India and in international law, some heartening, some 
disappointing; but all formative in appreciating the existing discourse on gender 
violence, which cannot be classified as solely based on gender. The framework 
shows what it is to say that gender violence is intersectional in nature—first, that it 
is both unique and similar to patterns of violence based on racism, casteism, 
sexism, ageism, homophobia, regionalism etc; and secondly, that such violence 
cannot be truly appreciated as gender violence alone but only as a whole by 
considering all the relevant status-identities of the claimants together and at the 
same time. The two dimensions of intersectionality and integrity thus provide the 
means for diagnosing and explaining the causal basis of intersectional gender 
violence as based on multiple identities in a systematic and comprehensive manner.  
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